India as It Is 印度的真实面貌

Washington and New Delhi Share Interests, Not Values 华盛顿和新德里有共同利益，但价值观不同

By Daniel Markey 丹尼尔·马基（Daniel Markey）

Benedetto Cristofani 贝内代托·克里斯托法尼

It has been a ritual for decades. Whenever American policymakers travel to India, they sing paeans to the beauty of Indian politics, to the country’s diversity, and to the shared values connecting—in the words of multiple U.S. presidents—“the world’s oldest democracy” and “the world’s largest democracy.” This rhetoric may be gauzy, and it is certainly grandiose. But to Washington, it is not empty. In the view of U.S. policymakers, common democratic principles will be the foundation of an enduring U.S.-Indian relationship, one with broad strategic significance. The world’s two biggest democracies, they say, can’t help but have similar worldviews and interests. 几十年来，这已经成为一种仪式。每当美国政策制定者前往印度时，他们都会赞美印度政治的美丽，赞美这个国家的多样性，赞美连接着“世界上最古老的民主国家”和“世界上最大的民主国家”的共同价值观。这种言辞可能有些虚幻，但肯定是宏大的。但对华盛顿来说，这并不是空洞的。在美国政策制定者看来，共同的民主原则将成为美印持久关系的基础，这种关系具有广泛的战略意义。他们说，世界上最大的两个民主国家不可避免地会有相似的世界观和利益。

“Our common interest in democracy and righteousness will enable your countrymen and mine to make common cause against a common enemy,” U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt wrote to Mohandas Gandhi, then the de facto leader of India’s independence movement, during World War II. During the Cold War, successive presidential administrations tried to get New Delhi to stand against Moscow by arguing that, as a democracy, India was a natural enemy of the Soviet Union. When President George W. Bush struck a breakthrough civilian nuclear deal with India in 2005, he declared that India’s democratic system meant that the two states were “natural partners” united “by deeply held values.” “我们对民主和正义的共同兴趣将使你们国家的人民和我的人民能够共同对抗一个共同的敌人。”美国总统富兰克林·罗斯福在二战期间写信给当时印度独立运动的事实上领导人莫汉达斯·甘地。在冷战期间，连续的美国总统政府试图让新德里站在莫斯科对立面，通过辩称作为一个民主国家，印度是苏联的天然敌人。当乔治·W·布什总统在2005年与印度达成突破性的民用核能协议时，他宣称印度的民主制度意味着这两个国家是“天然伙伴”，通过深深的价值观团结在一起。

Yet again and again, India has disappointed American hopes. Gandhi, for example, frustrated Roosevelt by prioritizing India’s struggle for freedom against the British Empire over the war against imperial Japan and Nazi Germany. New Delhi not only refused to align with Washington during the Cold War; it forged warm ties with Moscow instead. Even after the Cold War ended and India began strengthening its relations with the United States, New Delhi maintained strong connections to the Kremlin. It has refused to work with the United States on Iran, and it has made nice with Myanmar’s military regime. Most recently, it has refused to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. 一次又一次，印度让美国的希望破灭。例如，甘地优先考虑印度对抗英帝国争取自由的斗争，而不是对抗日本帝国和纳粹德国的战争，这让罗斯福感到沮丧。新德里不仅在冷战期间拒绝与华盛顿结盟，还与莫斯科建立了密切的联系。即使在冷战结束后，印度开始加强与美国的关系，新德里仍然与克里姆林宫保持着紧密的联系。它拒绝与美国在伊朗问题上合作，并与缅甸的军政府保持友好关系。最近，它拒绝谴责俄罗斯入侵乌克兰。

If making democratic values the cornerstone of the U.S.-Indian relationship has always been a dubious strategy, today it is clearly doomed—because the very notion of common values has itself come to look fanciful. Ever since Narendra Modi became the Indian prime minister nine years ago, India’s status as a democracy has become increasingly suspect. The “world’s largest democracy” has seen an upsurge in violence directed at its Muslim minority, often whipped up by prominent politicians. It is trying to strip citizenship from millions of Muslim residents. It is muzzling the press and silencing opposition figures. The Biden administration, having cast itself as a vocal champion of democratic ideals, therefore finds itself on shaky ground whenever it characterizes the United States’ partnership with India as one of shared values. 如果将民主价值观作为美印关系的基石一直以来都是一个可疑的策略，那么今天它显然注定要失败，因为共同价值观的概念本身已经变得不切实际。自从纳伦德拉·莫迪九年前成为印度总理以来，印度作为一个民主国家的地位越来越受到怀疑。这个“世界上最大的民主国家”看到了对其穆斯林少数民族的暴力行为的激增，这往往是由知名政治家煽动起来的。它试图剥夺数百万穆斯林居民的公民身份。它限制新闻自由，压制反对派人士的声音。拜登政府自称是民主理念的坚定捍卫者，因此每当它将美国与印度的伙伴关系描述为共同价值观的伙伴关系时，就会发现自己站在摇摆不定的地位上。

But it continues to do just that. In January, for example, the White House declared that the two states’ joint technology initiatives were “shaped by our shared democratic values and respect for universal human rights.” In June, Modi will visit Washington, D.C., for a formal state dinner meant to affirm “the warm bonds of family and friendship” that link the two countries. In February, however, the Indian government made it difficult for a leading Indian think tank to raise money, a major blow to intellectual freedom. In March, Modi’s party removed one of India’s most prominent opposition politicians from Parliament—explicitly because he insulted the prime minister. 但它继续这样做。例如，白宫在一月份宣布，两国联合技术计划是“由我们共同的民主价值观和对普世人权的尊重所塑造的。”六月份，莫迪将访问华盛顿特区，参加一场正式的国宴，旨在确认两国之间“温暖的家庭和友谊纽带”。然而，在二月份，印度政府使一家领先的印度智库筹集资金变得困难，这对知识自由是一个重大打击。三月份，莫迪的政党将印度最杰出的反对派政治家从议会中除名，明确是因为他侮辱了总理。

Yet even as the two countries’ shared values have grown weaker, their shared material interests have only gotten stronger. India and the United States now have a clear, common geopolitical foe in China, and each understands that the other can help it win its competition against Beijing. For the United States, India is a massive, pivotal power in Asia that sits astride critical maritime routes and shares a long, contested land border with China. For India, the United States is an attractive source of advanced technology, education, and investment. New Delhi may still have close ties with Moscow, but the uncertain quality and reliability of Russian arms mean that India is more open than ever to buying weapons from the West instead. 然而，尽管这两个国家的共同价值观变得越来越弱，但它们的共同物质利益却变得越来越强。印度和美国现在在中国身上有一个明确的共同地缘政治敌人，而且双方都明白对方可以帮助它在与北京的竞争中取得胜利。对于美国来说，印度是亚洲一个庞大而关键的力量，它位于重要的海上航线上，并与中国有着漫长而有争议的陆地边界。对于印度来说，美国是一个有吸引力的先进技术、教育和投资来源。新德里可能仍然与莫斯科有着密切的联系，但俄罗斯武器的质量和可靠性不确定，这意味着印度比以往更愿意从西方购买武器。

To capitalize on these complementary material interests, however, the United States must dispense with the idea that shared values can provide the bedrock of a strong relationship, justifying its high tolerance for New Delhi’s behavior on the basis of a bet on long-term convergence. Rather than considering India an ally in the fight for global democracy, it must see that India is an ally of convenience. This shift will not be easy, given that Washington has spent decades looking at New Delhi through rose-colored glasses. But the pivot will encourage both sides to understand that their relationship is ultimately transactional—and allow them to get down to business.  为了利用这些互补的物质利益，然而，美国必须放弃共同价值观可以成为坚实关系基石的想法，不能再以长期趋同为赌注来为新德里的行为辩护。与其将印度视为全球民主斗争中的盟友，美国必须认识到印度只是一个便利的盟友。鉴于华盛顿几十年来一直戴着玫瑰色眼镜看待新德里，这种转变并不容易。但这一转变将鼓励双方认识到他们的关系最终是交易性的，并让他们开始着手处理实际问题。

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American leaders, especially liberal ones, have long believed that democratic institutions are a defining feature of India’s identity—and the reason why New Delhi deserves Washington’s support. In 1958, for example, then Senator John Kennedy introduced a bipartisan resolution to increase assistance to India, premised on the idea that it was vital for the United States to support a fledgling democracy against communist encroachment. India’s “democratic future is delicately and dangerously poised,” Kennedy declared in a landmark speech. “It would be catastrophic if its leadership were now humiliated in its quest for Western assistance when its cause is good.” 美国领导人，尤其是自由派人士，长期以来一直认为，民主制度是印度身份的一个重要特征，也是新德里值得华盛顿支持的原因。例如，1958年，时任参议员约翰·肯尼迪提出了一项跨党派决议，旨在增加对印度的援助，其前提是美国有必要支持一个新兴的民主国家抵御共产主义的侵蚀。肯尼迪在一次具有里程碑意义的演讲中宣称，印度的“民主未来岌岌可危”，“如果在其追求西方援助的正义事业中，其领导层现在受到羞辱，那将是灾难性的。”

As the former diplomat Dennis Kux wrote in India and the United States: Estranged Democracies, “The effort succeeded.” During President Dwight Eisenhower’s second term, Kux notes, “US assistance grew substantially, surging from about $400 million in 1957, to a record $822 million in 1960.” Eisenhower himself seemed committed to India’s democratic future. As the president stated in remarks at the opening of the World Agriculture Fair in New Delhi in December 1959, “Whatever strengthens India, my people are convinced, strengthens us, a sister republic dedicated to peace.” Six months later, Eisenhower signed a breakthrough multiyear deal with India to deliver $1.28 billion in food aid under the United States’ Food for Peace program, because India’s domestic farmers were routinely unable to meet the country’s food needs. 正如前外交官丹尼斯·库克斯在《印度与美国：疏离的民主国家》一书中所写：“这一努力取得了成功。”库克斯指出，在艾森豪威尔总统的第二个任期内，“美国援助大幅增加，从1957年的约4亿美元激增至1960年的创纪录的8.22亿美元。”艾森豪威尔总统本人似乎致力于印度的民主未来。正如总统在1959年12月在新德里世界农业博览会开幕式上所说的：“无论是什么能够加强印度，我的人民都深信，也会加强我们，作为一个致力于和平的姐妹共和国。”六个月后，艾森豪威尔与印度签署了一项突破性的多年协议，根据美国“粮食换和平”计划向印度提供12.8亿美元的粮食援助，因为印度国内的农民经常无法满足国家的粮食需求。

But if Kennedy and Eisenhower hoped that praising India would turn New Delhi into an ally, they were sorely mistaken. In 1954, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had explicitly declared that his country would remain nonaligned in the Cold War, rankling Eisenhower. Kennedy, as president, hoped he could bring India closer by having Nehru visit Washington in 1961, but the trip changed nothing. The prime minister rebuffed all his efforts to bring India into the United States’ orbit. 但是，如果肯尼迪和艾森豪威尔希望赞扬印度能够使新德里成为盟友，那么他们大错特错了。1954年，印度总理贾瓦哈拉尔·尼赫鲁明确宣布他的国家将在冷战中保持中立，这让艾森豪威尔感到不悦。作为总统，肯尼迪希望通过邀请尼赫鲁在1961年访问华盛顿来拉近与印度的关系，但这次访问并没有改变什么。尼赫鲁总理拒绝了所有试图将印度纳入美国势力范围的努力。

Modi speaking at a rally in Houston, Texas, September 2019Modi speaking at a rally in Houston, Texas, September 2019 莫迪在2019年9月的德克萨斯州休斯顿集会上发表讲话Daniel Kramer / Reuters 丹尼尔·克莱默/路透社

As Kux recounts, Kennedy’s Cold War successors were similarly frustrated by New Delhi. President Lyndon Johnson found Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s 1966 criticism of U.S. involvement in Vietnam to be particularly galling; his ambassador to India later recalled that the president’s reaction ranged “from the violent to the obscene.” Gandhi’s subsequent decision, in 1971, to conclude a “Friendship Treaty” with Moscow was later described by former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger as a “bombshell” that threw “a lighted match into a powder keg,” inflaming relations between India and Pakistan. And in January 1980, when India’s permanent ambassador to the United Nations effectively endorsed the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, President Jimmy Carter was livid. Carter’s ambassador in New Delhi told Gandhi “what a devastating statement it had been from the American point of view and what a terrible backlash it had caused in the United States.” 据库克斯回忆，肯尼迪的冷战继任者们同样对新德里感到沮丧。林登·约翰逊总统对印度总理英迪拉·甘地1966年对美国参与越南战争的批评感到特别愤怒；他在印度的大使后来回忆说，总统的反应从“激烈到下流”不等。甘地随后在1971年决定与莫斯科签署一项“友谊条约”，这一举动被前美国国务卿亨利·基辛格形容为“一颗引爆弹”，引发了印巴关系的火药桶。而1980年1月，当印度常驻联合国大使有效地支持苏联入侵阿富汗时，吉米·卡特总统勃然大怒。卡特在新德里的大使告诉甘地，“从美国的角度来看，这是一个毁灭性的声明，引起了可怕的反弹。”

Nonetheless, U.S. policymakers often praised India in the following decades, and policymakers continued to argue that India’s democratic principles made it a good partner. In his address to India’s Parliament in 2000, President Bill Clinton asserted that the strength of India’s democracy was the first of several important lessons it had taught the world. The administrations of Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama routinely employed the “oldest and largest democracies” formulation to describe Washington and New Delhi and their longtime ties. In a 2010 speech to the Indian Parliament, Obama repeatedly stressed the unique bond shared by “two strong democracies.” He then endorsed India’s effort to obtain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, suggesting that cooperation between India and the United States on the council would strengthen “the foundations of democratic governance, not only at home but abroad.” 然而，美国政策制定者在接下来的几十年中经常赞扬印度，并继续主张印度的民主原则使其成为一个良好的伙伴。2000年，比尔·克林顿总统在对印度议会的讲话中强调，印度的民主力量是它向世界传递的几个重要教训之一。乔治·W·布什总统和巴拉克·奥巴马总统的政府经常使用“最古老、最大的民主国家”这一说法来描述华盛顿和新德里以及它们之间长期的联系。奥巴马在2010年对印度议会的演讲中多次强调“两个强大的民主国家”之间独特的纽带。他随后支持印度争取联合国安全理事会常任理事国的努力，并表示印度和美国在理事会上的合作将加强“民主治理的基础，不仅在国内，而且在国外”。

Obama’s Security Council reform has yet to materialize, but it is difficult to see how India’s performance at the UN would ever live up to U.S. expectations. In the UN General Assembly from 2014 to 2019, only 20 percent of India’s votes were coincident with those of the United States. Even when votes on Israeli and Palestinian issues (on which the two states are even further apart) are excluded, the figure rises to only 24 percent. By comparison, France voted with the United States 57 percent of the time overall and 67 percent of the time when Israeli and Palestinian issues were left out. This divergence shouldn’t be surprising; India has routinely walked away from the United States’ biggest international initiatives. It has never joined a Washington-led trade agreement, for example. And it has never given much more than lip service to Washington’s drives to expand democracy, whether in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, during the Bush administration’s efforts to promote the so-called freedom agenda, or during the Arab Spring of the Obama years. 奥巴马的安全理事会改革尚未实现，但很难看出印度在联合国的表现如何能够达到美国的期望。在2014年至2019年的联合国大会上，印度的选票与美国的重合率仅为20%。即使排除以色列和巴勒斯坦问题的投票（在这些问题上，两国之间的分歧更大），这个数字也只有24%。相比之下，法国总体上与美国的投票一致率为57%，而在排除以色列和巴勒斯坦问题后，一致率达到67%。这种分歧并不令人意外；印度经常远离美国的最大国际倡议。例如，它从未加入过由华盛顿主导的贸易协定。而且，无论是在冷战后期，布什政府努力推动所谓的自由议程，还是在奥巴马时期的阿拉伯之春期间，印度对于华盛顿扩大民主的努力从未给予过多的支持，只是口头上表示支持而已。

Despite these disappointments, the Biden administration has continued to push for closer ties with India, leaning hard into the two states’ supposedly common values as it makes its case. President Joe Biden invited Modi to Washington’s two democracy summits, and the prime minister delivered remarks at each. In a May 2022 meeting with Modi, Biden said that cooperation between India and the United States is built on their shared “commitment to representative democracy.” When Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited India in July 2021, he said that “the relationship between our two countries is so important and so strong because it is a relationship between our democracies.” And on a March 2023 trip to New Delhi, Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo praised Modi as an “unbelievable visionary” and declared that the two states were united by democratic principles. 尽管面临这些失望，拜登政府仍在努力推动与印度的紧密联系，并强调两国所谓的共同价值观。乔·拜登总统邀请莫迪参加了华盛顿的两次民主峰会，并且莫迪总理在每次峰会上发表了讲话。在2022年5月与莫迪的会晤中，拜登表示印美合作建立在双方对代议制民主的共同承诺之上。当时任国务卿安东尼·布林肯于2021年7月访问印度时，他表示“我们两国之间的关系非常重要且牢固，因为这是我们两个民主国家之间的关系。”在2023年3月访问新德里期间，商务部长吉娜·雷蒙多称赞莫迪是一个“令人难以置信的有远见的人”，并宣称两国是基于民主原则的伙伴关系。

But yet again, New Delhi has frustrated the White House on policies related to liberal values. It has, for instance, maintained ties with and sold weapons to the military junta that ousted Myanmar’s democratic government in 2021. New Delhi plays an active role in multilateral groups critical of the United States and the West, such as the BRICS, which also includes Brazil, Russia, China, and South Africa. And it has continued to stand by Moscow. Shortly before Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, India went ahead with purchases of Russian S-400 air defense systems, despite the threat of U.S. sanctions. Since the invasion, India has abstained on every decisive UN vote. It has refused to entertain any economic restrictions against Russia. It even began purchasing more Russian energy after the invasion began. 然而，新德里再次让白宫对与自由价值观相关的政策感到沮丧。例如，它与并向2021年推翻缅甸民主政府的军政府保持联系并出售武器。新德里在批评美国和西方的多边组织中发挥着积极作用，例如金砖国家，其中还包括巴西、俄罗斯、中国和南非。它继续支持莫斯科。在俄罗斯于2022年2月入侵乌克兰之前不久，印度继续购买俄罗斯的S-400防空系统，尽管面临美国制裁的威胁。自入侵以来，印度在每次决定性的联合国投票中弃权。它拒绝对俄罗斯实施任何经济限制。甚至在入侵开始后，它还开始购买更多的俄罗斯能源。

India’s behavior regarding the war in Ukraine, in particular, has angered many of New Delhi’s biggest supporters in the U.S. Congress. “Frankly, many of my colleagues and I are puzzled by India’s equivocation in the face of the biggest threat to democracy since World War II,” said Senator Chris Murphy, Democrat of Connecticut, who chairs the Senate subcommittee responsible for South Asia. “At a time when democracies are closing ranks to condemn Russia’s invasion, it is troubling, to say the least, to see India, the world’s largest democracy, sitting on the sidelines.” 印度在乌克兰战争中的行为特别令美国国会中许多新德里最大的支持者感到愤怒。“坦率地说，我和我的许多同事对印度在面对自二战以来最大的民主威胁时的犹豫不决感到困惑，”康涅狄格州民主党参议员克里斯·墨菲说道，他是负责南亚事务的参议院小组委员会主席。“在民主国家正在团结一致谴责俄罗斯入侵的时候，看到世界上最大的民主国家印度袖手旁观，这令人不安，至少可以这么说。”

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New Delhi’s position on Ukraine certainly cuts against its espoused values. But it is far from India’s biggest democratic failure. Since winning two sweeping national victories, one in 2014 and another in 2019, Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party has made India’s own attachment to liberalism more and more dubious. The BJP has hollowed out institutions that can check the prime minister’s behavior, including by politicizing India’s civilian bureaucracy and turning its Parliament into a rubber stamp for the party’s priorities. Modi also tolerates no criticism in the media, academia, or civil society. The government, for example, imposed an outright ban on a 2023 BBC documentary that detailed Modi’s role in the state of Gujarat’s deadly 2002 communal riots. The organizations that compile the three biggest rankings of democracy across the world—the V-Dem (Varieties of Democracy) Institute, Freedom House, and the Economist Intelligence Unit—have all downgraded India’s score since Modi took office. 新德里对乌克兰的立场确实违背了其所宣扬的价值观。但这远非印度最大的民主失败。自2014年和2019年赢得两次全国大胜以来，莫迪的人民党使印度对自由主义的依恋变得越来越可疑。人民党削弱了可以制约总理行为的机构，包括将印度的文职官僚政治化，并将议会变成党派优先事项的橡皮图章。莫迪还容不得媒体、学术界或民间社会的任何批评。例如，政府对一部BBC的纪录片实施了完全禁令，该纪录片详细描述了莫迪在古吉拉特邦2002年的致命骚乱中的角色。编制全球三大民主排名的组织——V-Dem（多样化民主）研究所、自由之家和经济学人智库——自莫迪上台以来，都降低了对印度的评分。

New Delhi’s democratic failings extend beyond eliminating checks and balances. The BJP is deeply intertwined with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, an organization that aims to give India an exclusively Hindu identity (and to which Modi belongs). Created in 1925, the RSS was modeled on interwar European fascist groups and charged with promoting, in the words of one founder, “the military regeneration of the Hindus.” This goal was directly opposed by Mohandas Gandhi and Nehru, who championed freedom of religion, celebrated diversity, and defended minority rights. That is why a radicalized Hindu nationalist and RSS member assassinated Gandhi in 1948. 新德里的民主缺陷不仅仅体现在消除制衡上。人民党与印度民族志愿服务组织（RSS）紧密相连，该组织旨在赋予印度独有的印度教身份（莫迪也是该组织的成员）。RSS成立于1925年，以战间期欧洲法西斯团体为蓝本，并负责推动“印度教的军事再生”，如其一位创始人所言。这一目标直接与甘地和尼赫鲁相对立，后者倡导宗教自由、推崇多样性并捍卫少数群体权益。这也是为什么一个激进的印度教民族主义者和RSS成员在1948年暗杀了甘地。

India’s autocratic turn creates many problems for the United States. One is that it simply makes New Delhi less trustworthy. Democratically accountable leaders need to justify and defend foreign policies to their own citizens, which makes their decisions more transparent and predictable. Authoritarian decisions, by contrast, are far harder to predict. In addition, the more ethnonationalist New Delhi becomes, the less secure India will be. India is home to roughly 200 million Muslims—almost the size of Pakistan’s entire population—and it has an extensive history of communal violence. By repressing its minorities, India risks its tenuous stability in the near term and mounting and debilitating violence in the long term. And an India consumed with internal security challenges will have fewer resources, less bandwidth for foreign policy, and less legitimacy to play a constructive role beyond its borders. 印度的专制转变给美国带来了许多问题。其中一个问题是，这使得新德里变得不那么可信。民主负责的领导人需要向自己的公民证明和捍卫外交政策，这使得他们的决策更加透明和可预测。相比之下，专制决策要难以预测得多。此外，新德里越来越民族主义化，印度的安全性就越低。印度大约有2亿穆斯林，几乎与巴基斯坦的整个人口规模相当，并且印度有着悠久的群体暴力历史。通过镇压少数民族，印度在短期内冒着稳定性风险，并可能在长期内面临越来越多的暴力和破坏。而一个忙于内部安全挑战的印度将拥有更少的资源、更少的外交政策空间，以及在其边界之外发挥建设性作用的合法性更少。

School children gesturing toward Modi in Ahmedabad, India, December 2022School children gesturing toward Modi in Ahmedabad, India, December 2022 2022年12月，印度艾哈迈达巴德的学童们向莫迪示意Amit Dave / Reuters 阿米特·戴夫/路透社

India’s Hindu nationalism at home also leads it to promote illiberal aims abroad. Hindu nationalists believe that one of their top foreign policy achievements has been mobilizing overseas RSS-affiliated groups in the Indian diaspora to lobby other capitals, including Washington, to support BJP initiatives. Hindu nationalists also believe that India should be a sprawling, civilizational power, and many of them say they want to create Akhand Bharat—a greater “Undivided India”—in which New Delhi would build a “cultural confederation” of territory stretching from Afghanistan to Myanmar and Sri Lanka to Tibet. In 2022, for example, the RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat claimed that this could be a reality in as little as ten to 15 years. His statements raised questions about what a Hindu cultural confederation would actually mean, and they have prompted at least some regional consternation about whether India’s drive for leadership will be as peaceful as the country claims. 印度的印度教民族主义在国内也导致其在国外推动非自由目标。印度教民族主义者认为，他们在外交政策上的最大成就之一是动员海外RSS附属团体在印度散居地游说其他国家，包括华盛顿，支持人民党的倡议。印度教民族主义者还认为，印度应该成为一个庞大的文明强国，他们中的许多人表示希望创建阿坎德·巴拉特——一个更大的“不分割的印度”，其中新德里将建立一个从阿富汗到缅甸、斯里兰卡到西藏的“文化联盟”的领土。例如，在2022年，RSS主席莫汉·巴格瓦特声称，这可能在十到十五年内成为现实。他的言论引发了关于印度文化联盟实际意义的质疑，并引发了至少一些地区对印度领导力追求是否像该国声称的那样和平的担忧。

Despite the obvious evidence of the BJP’s illiberalism, top Biden administration officials have avoided publicly criticizing the Modi government. Instead, they have brushed aside concerns by declaring, as Blinken did in 2021, that every democracy is an imperfect “work in progress.” Presumably, that is because Biden believes that expressing any concerns about Indian policies would cause too much harm to the relationship. 尽管印度人民党的不自由主义明显可见，拜登政府高级官员却避免公开批评莫迪政府。相反，他们通过宣称每个民主国家都是一个不完美的“正在进行中的工作”来搪塞关切，就像布林肯在2021年所说的那样。可以推测，这是因为拜登认为对印度政策表达任何关切都会对两国关系造成过多的伤害。

This fear is not baseless. Like most countries, India does not like to be criticized, so an honest airing of grievances would not go down well. But the current, disingenuous approach has its own price. Soft-pedaling concerns about India’s authoritarian slide, for example, weakens Washington’s ability to champion democracy around the world. In fact, it might actively encourage democratic backsliding. India is no garden-variety struggling democracy: it is the world’s most populous country and a leader in the global South. When Modi uses his association with Washington to burnish his democratic credentials and even to strengthen his self-serving narrative that Hindu India is “the mother of democracy” (as he declared during Washington’s 2023 Summit for Democracy), it sets back liberalism everywhere. 这种担忧并非毫无根据。像大多数国家一样，印度不喜欢受到批评，因此坦诚地表达不满并不会得到好的回应。但目前这种虚伪的做法也有其代价。例如，对印度威权主义倾向的关切轻描淡写，削弱了华盛顿在全球倡导民主的能力。事实上，这可能会积极鼓励民主倒退。印度并不是一个普通的挣扎中的民主国家：它是世界上人口最多的国家，也是全球南方的领导者。当莫迪利用与华盛顿的关联来提升他的民主信誉，甚至加强他自私的宣传，声称印度教印度是“民主之母”（正如他在华盛顿2023年民主峰会上宣布的那样），这将阻碍自由主义的发展。

Praising India’s democracy also makes it hard for Biden to build the domestic political alliances he needs to cooperate with New Delhi on security. Many powerful U.S. constituencies, including evangelical Christian groups, are deeply concerned about India’s poor treatment of minorities, its crackdown on religious freedoms, and its stifling of the press. The New York Times and The Washington Post, along with other top U.S. media outlets, run stories and columns on these issues so frequently that BJP leaders have gone out of their way to label the publications “anti-Indian.” And influential figures in Washington are expressing growing alarm about India’s illiberal policies. In March 2021, for example, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair Bob Menendez wrote a letter to Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, asking that he use his upcoming India trip to “make clear that in all areas, including security cooperation, the U.S.-India partnership must rest on adherence to democratic values.” If Biden continues to emphasize principles in his pitch for better relations, his calls could face mounting opposition. 赞扬印度的民主制度也使拜登在建立国内政治联盟方面面临困难，而这些联盟对于与新德里在安全问题上合作至关重要。许多强大的美国选民群体，包括福音派基督教团体，对印度对待少数群体的不公、对宗教自由的打压以及对新闻自由的限制深感担忧。《纽约时报》和《华盛顿邮报》以及其他顶级美国媒体频繁报道这些问题，以至于人民党领导人不惜称这些媒体为“反印度”。华盛顿的有影响力人物也对印度的非自由政策表达了越来越大的担忧。例如，2021年3月，参议院外交关系委员会主席鲍勃·梅嫩德斯写信给国防部长劳埃德·奥斯汀，要求他在即将进行的印度之行中“明确表示在所有领域，包括安全合作，美印伙伴关系必须建立在民主价值观的基础上。”如果拜登继续强调原则来促进更好的关系，他的呼吁可能会面临越来越多的反对。

ENEMY OF MY ENEMY 敌人的敌人

India’s turn away from democracy is deeply unfortunate. But New Delhi is still an invaluable partner for Washington. In addition to being the world’s most populous state, India boasts the world’s fifth-largest economy, the world’s second-largest military, and a significant cadre of highly educated scientists and engineers. It has a large arsenal of nuclear weapons. And like the United States, India is deeply concerned about China, which it sees as a dangerous power intent on challenging the regional and global order. In a way, now may be the best moment for the United States to cooperate with India. The question is how far Washington should go. 印度背离民主制度的转变令人深感遗憾。但新德里仍然是华盛顿的宝贵合作伙伴。除了是世界上人口最多的国家之一，印度还拥有世界第五大经济体、世界第二大军事力量以及大量受过高等教育的科学家和工程师。它拥有庞大的核武器库。与美国一样，印度对中国深感忧虑，认为中国是一个有意挑战地区和全球秩序的危险大国。从某种意义上说，现在可能是美国与印度合作的最佳时机。问题是华盛顿应该走多远。

In many cases, the decision to help India is easy. When China began encroaching on Indian territory along the Chinese-Indian border, prompting deadly clashes between the two countries’ militaries in 2020, Washington rightfully provided New Delhi with urgently needed cold-weather gear and intelligence on Chinese positions. It also expedited already planned deliveries of surveillance drones. Since then, U.S. officials have correctly concluded that they can have far more candid discussions with India’s leaders than they have had in the past about defense cooperation, both on land and at sea. They hope that the threat from China, combined with Russia’s disastrous invasion of Ukraine, presents Washington with a once-in-a-generation opportunity to decisively (if not immediately) get New Delhi to shift its heavy reliance on Russian-made military gear to U.S. systems. 在许多情况下，帮助印度的决定是很容易的。当中国开始侵占中印边境领土，引发了2020年两国军队之间的致命冲突时，华盛顿理所当然地向新德里提供了急需的寒冷天气装备和对中国阵地的情报。它还加快了已计划的无人机交付。自那时以来，美国官员正确地得出结论，他们可以与印度领导人进行更加坦诚的讨论，这在过去是不可能的，讨论的内容包括陆地和海上的防务合作。他们希望来自中国的威胁，再加上俄罗斯对乌克兰的灾难性入侵，为华盛顿提供了一个一生一次的机会，以决定性的方式（即使不是立即）让新德里转变其对俄罗斯制造的军事装备的过度依赖，转向美国的系统。

Greater U.S.-Indian alignment on China also means the two states could cooperate on certain kinds of technology. Washington, for example, could work with New Delhi to develop alternatives to Chinese-built information and telecommunications infrastructure as a means to compete in a global industry that Beijing has threatened to dominate. The United States could also speed up its efforts to diversify essential industrial inputs away from China and toward India. New Delhi, in turn, would benefit from new economic investments. 美印在对华立场上更加一致，也意味着两国可以在某些技术领域展开合作。例如，华盛顿可以与新德里合作，开发替代中国建设的信息和电信基础设施，以在北京威胁主导的全球产业中竞争。美国还可以加快将关键工业输入从中国转向印度的努力。而新德里则将从新的经济投资中受益。

But Washington must be careful about the ways it deals with New Delhi. It must remain keenly aware that India’s desire to work with the United States is born of circumstance, not conviction, and could quickly disappear. New Delhi, after all, spent most of the post–Cold War years vacillating about what role it should play between Beijing and Washington, and it often signed on to the former’s initiatives. Even after the border clashes, China and India have roughly the same volume of trade as India and the United States have. New Delhi is still part of the Beijing-founded Shanghai Cooperation Organization. And many Indian policymakers and analysts would much prefer a multipolar world in which India is free to navigate flexible relationships with other great powers to a world led by the United States or defined by a new cold war between Beijing and Washington—a world in which New Delhi must take sides. One of New Delhi’s greatest fears is being indefinitely consigned to the geopolitical sidelines. 但是华盛顿在处理与新德里的关系时必须小心。它必须清楚意识到印度与美国合作的愿望是出于环境的需要，而非信念，并且可能很快消失。毕竟，新德里在后冷战时期大部分时间都在摇摆不定，不知道自己在北京和华盛顿之间应该扮演什么角色，并且经常支持前者的倡议。即使在边境冲突之后，中国和印度的贸易规模与印度和美国的贸易规模相当。新德里仍然是由北京创立的上海合作组织的一部分。许多印度政策制定者和分析人士更希望看到一个多极世界，让印度能够自由地与其他大国建立灵活的关系，而不是一个由美国主导或由北京和华盛顿之间的新冷战定义的世界——一个新德里必须选择立场的世界。新德里最大的担忧之一就是被无限期地排除在地缘政治的边缘。

For U.S. officials, then, cooperation with India must be tightly targeted to countering immediate threats posed by China. It is fine, for example, for the United States to conduct joint military exercises with India near the Chinese border, as the two states did in November 2022. It is also fine for Washington to strike transactional deals that obviously advance U.S. interests, such as a deal that gives the United States access to Indian seaports in exchange for finite technology transfers or additional intelligence. But when U.S. policies do not clearly enhance U.S.-Indian cooperation with respect to China, they should not receive the benefit of the doubt. The United States should think twice, for example, before approving a proposal General Electric put forward earlier this year to co-produce and transfer U.S. technology to India for advanced fighter jet engines. Washington may benefit from a better Indian military in the short term, but the GE deal could strengthen India’s indigenous defense industry for decades, which might not serve U.S. interests in the long term. 对于美国官员来说，与印度的合作必须紧密针对中国所带来的即时威胁。例如，美国与印度在中国边境附近进行联合军事演习是可以的，就像两国在2022年11月所做的那样。华盛顿与印度达成明显有利于美国的交易也是可以的，比如为了有限的技术转让或额外的情报，美国获得进入印度海港的权利。但是，如果美国的政策在与中国有关的问题上并没有明显增进美印合作的效果，那么它们就不应该得到怀疑的好处。例如，美国应该三思而后行，审慎考虑今年早些时候通用电气提出的与印度共同生产和转让美国技术用于先进战斗机发动机的提议。华盛顿可能会在短期内从印度军事实力的提升中受益，但通用电气的交易可能会在未来几十年加强印度的国防工业，这可能不符合美国的长期利益。

U.S. officials must understand that, deep down, India is not an ally. Its relationship to the United States is fundamentally unlike that of, say, a NATO member. And India will never aspire to that sort of alliance. For this reason, U.S. officials should not frame their agreements with India as the building blocks of a deeper relationship. The country is not a candidate for initiatives such as the AUKUS deal among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (which will help Australia develop nuclear submarine technologies) because such deals entail sharing important security vulnerabilities that only sturdy liberal democracies—ones with broadly shared values and aspirations—can safely exchange. India’s uncertain commitment to democratic principles is also why Washington will never be able to share intelligence with New Delhi in the way that it does with its so-called Five Eyes partners: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. 美国官员必须明白，从根本上说，印度并非盟友。它与美国的关系与北约成员国的关系根本不同。而且印度永远不会追求那种联盟关系。因此，美国官员不应将与印度的协议视为深化关系的基石。印度不适合像澳大利亚、英国和美国之间的AUKUS协议那样的倡议（该协议将帮助澳大利亚发展核潜艇技术），因为这类协议涉及共享重要的安全漏洞，只有具备广泛共享价值观和愿景的坚实自由民主国家才能安全交换。印度对民主原则的不确定承诺也是华盛顿无法像与所谓的“五眼联盟”伙伴（澳大利亚、加拿大、新西兰和英国）分享情报的原因之一。

In fact, Washington should qualify its support for greater Indian participation in the international organizations to which New Delhi already belongs. India’s voice is essential on the world stage, especially because of its vast and diverse society. But considering how often India and the United States diverge on important issues, it is not a bad thing that no one has taken up Obama’s proposal to offer India a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Washington should similarly temper its expectations for the Quad—the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, among Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. The White House clearly hopes that the Quad can be an Indo-Pacific league of liberal democracies. But given India’s identity, it simply cannot. What the Quad can do is better deter Chinese aggression in the region, and it should dedicate itself to that task. 事实上，华盛顿应该对印度在已经加入的国际组织中的更大参与给予限定性支持。印度在世界舞台上的发声至关重要，尤其是因为其庞大而多元的社会。但考虑到印度和美国在重要问题上经常意见不合，没有人采纳奥巴马提议给予印度联合国安全理事会永久席位的想法并不是件坏事。华盛顿应该同样降低对四方安全对话（澳大利亚、印度、日本和美国之间的对话）的期望。白宫显然希望四方安全对话能成为一个印太地区的自由民主联盟。但考虑到印度的身份，这是不可能的。四方安全对话能做的是更好地遏制中国在该地区的侵略行为，并应该致力于这一任务。

TRUTH BE TOLD 说实话

As the Biden administration pivots away from seeking an imaginary relationship based on values to acknowledging a real one based on mutual interests, it must be forthright. The administration ought to explain to Indian and U.S. audiences alike that shared concerns about China and a wide array of other common interests create strong and constructive incentives for cooperation; there is much that the two sides can do together. But Washington needs to cease endorsing Modi’s BJP. It must stop altruistically subsidizing the rise of another illiberal Asian giant. And the Indian government should know that its domestic political decisions have the potential to complicate and endanger relations with Washington. Indian voters should know that, too. 随着拜登政府从追求基于价值观的虚幻关系转向承认基于共同利益的真实关系，它必须坦诚相待。政府应该向印度和美国的观众解释，对中国的共同关切以及广泛的其他共同利益为合作创造了强大而建设性的动力；双方可以共同做很多事情。但是华盛顿需要停止支持莫迪的人民党。它必须停止无私地资助另一个非自由的亚洲巨人的崛起。而印度政府应该知道，它的国内政治决策有可能使与华盛顿的关系复杂化并处于危险之中。印度选民也应该知道这一点。

The Biden administration should also write and publish more reports that accurately depict India’s record on human rights, freedoms, and democratic practices. Such analysis should then become required reading for U.S. leaders, including Pentagon policymakers and uniformed officers, who need to understand how undemocratic the world’s largest democracy is. These reports must be scrupulously accurate, because they will certainly draw fire from Indian diplomats. But Biden should not worry that U.S. criticism will derail cooperation. Unlike Chinese military activities, a critical report from the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom does not materially threaten New Delhi. If India and the United States are going to be strong partners, both sides need to learn how to navigate serious disagreements without sweeping them under the rug, even if that means suffering some unpleasantness along the way. U.S. officials can unapologetically explain the American perspective without being undiplomatic, just as their Indian counterparts frequently do. 拜登政府还应该撰写并发布更多准确反映印度在人权、自由和民主实践方面记录的报告。这样的分析应该成为美国领导人的必读材料，包括五角大楼的政策制定者和军官，他们需要了解世界上最大的民主国家是多么不民主。这些报告必须非常准确，因为它们肯定会招致印度外交官的抨击。但拜登不必担心美国的批评会破坏合作。与中国的军事活动不同，美国国际宗教自由委员会的批评报告并不会对新德里构成实质性威胁。如果印度和美国要成为强大的伙伴，双方都需要学会如何在严重分歧中航行，而不是把它们掩盖过去，即使这意味着在这个过程中遭受一些不愉快。美国官员可以毫不掩饰地解释美国的观点，而不失外交手腕，就像他们的印度同行经常做的那样。

Many U.S. opponents of the Modi government would go even further, arguing that criticism of India’s democratic shortcomings should be bolstered by active U.S. government initiatives—such as giving material support to Indian rights groups. Some critics have even encouraged Washington to withhold U.S. security cooperation unless India rolls back recent autocratic measures. But New Delhi is likely to balk at conditional defense ties, and pro-democracy investments will not be effective. India is almost unimaginably enormous and complicated, making it nearly impervious to outside political influence. As a postcolonial state, it is quite practiced at resisting, ignoring, or mitigating external interference. Better, then, to leave the task of strengthening India’s democracy to the Indians themselves. 许多美国反对莫迪政府的人甚至更进一步，主张应该通过积极的美国政府行动来加强对印度民主缺陷的批评，比如向印度人权组织提供物质支持。一些批评者甚至鼓励华盛顿方面在印度取消最近的专制措施之前暂停美国的安全合作。但是新德里很可能对有条件的防务关系表示反对，而且对民主投资也不会产生实质效果。印度几乎是难以想象的庞大和复杂，使其几乎对外部政治影响无动于衷。作为一个后殖民国家，它在抵抗、忽视或减轻外部干涉方面非常有经验。因此，更好的做法是将加强印度民主的任务留给印度人自己。

For now, that means the United States will have to deal with an unsavory government in New Delhi. But for Washington, this is nothing new. The United States has spent years cooperating with regimes it dislikes in order to bolster its security. At one point, it even worked with the country New Delhi and Washington are now trying to outcompete. The Nixon administration’s 1972 opening to China was intended to exploit the differences between Beijing and Moscow to deliver a decisive advantage to the United States in the Cold War. It succeeded: President Richard Nixon’s gambit deepened splits in the global communist movement, helped tie down Soviet army divisions along the border with China, and provided Washington with additional leverage over Moscow. 目前，这意味着美国将不得不与新德里的一个令人不悦的政府打交道。但对华盛顿来说，这并不新鲜。多年来，美国一直与其不喜欢的政权合作，以加强自身的安全。曾经，美国甚至与现在试图超越的国家新德里合作过。尼克松政府在1972年对中国的开放旨在利用北京和莫斯科之间的分歧，为美国在冷战中取得决定性优势。这一策略成功了：理查德·尼克松总统的策略加深了全球共产主义运动的分裂，帮助牵制了苏联军队在与中国的边境地区的部署，并为华盛顿提供了对莫斯科的额外影响力。

What followed, however, is much more controversial. Nixon’s opening eventually led to a deluge of U.S. investment in China’s economy and cooperation across many sectors—including, at times, defense and security. The United States’ contributions helped China quickly become the world’s second-largest economy. Washington instead should have had a greater appreciation for the ways in which U.S. and Chinese interests would most likely diverge as China’s power grew. American policymakers could have then lowered their expectations, narrowed the scope of official cooperation, and even ruled out certain types of commerce. In hindsight, it is clear they could have partnered with Beijing to contain Moscow without contributing so much to the rise of a peer competitor. 然而，随之而来的事情却更具争议性。尼克松的开放最终导致了美国对中国经济的大规模投资，并在许多领域展开合作，包括时而涉及国防和安全。美国的贡献帮助中国迅速成为世界第二大经济体。相反，华盛顿应该更加重视随着中国实力增长，美中利益可能出现分歧的方式。美国政策制定者本可以降低期望值，缩小官方合作的范围，甚至排除某些商业类型。回顾起来，很明显他们本可以与北京合作遏制莫斯科，而不必为崛起的竞争对手做出如此大的贡献。

India, of course, is not China, and it may never pose the same sort of challenge. And New Delhi’s authoritarian turn has not been total. Despite the government’s best efforts, India still has free (if not fair) elections and a vocal domestic opposition. Americans and Indians can, and should, hold out hope that India’s diverse society will remake India into a liberal democracy more fundamentally aligned with the ideals that Washington seeks to uphold. 印度当然不是中国，可能永远也不会带来同样的挑战。尽管新德里的权威转变并不完全，但印度仍然拥有自由（尽管不公平）的选举和有声的国内反对派。美国人和印度人可以，也应该，抱有希望，希望印度多元的社会能够将印度重新塑造成与华盛顿所追求的理念更为基本一致的自由民主国家。

That, however, is not where India is today. The country is instead led by an ethnonationalist who tolerates little dissent. It is in thrall to an illiberal and increasingly undemocratic party, and that party’s grip on politics is only becoming firmer. Unless that changes, the United States will not be able to treat India as it treats Japan, South Korea, and NATO allies in Europe. It must instead treat India as it treats Jordan, Vietnam, and any number of other illiberal partners. It must, in other words, cooperate with India on the reality of shared interests, not on the hope of shared values. 然而，印度并不是今天的样子。这个国家实际上是由一个容忍少许异议的民族主义者领导的。它受制于一个不自由和日益非民主的政党，而这个政党对政治的掌控只会变得更加牢固。除非这种情况发生改变，美国将无法像对待日本、韩国和北约盟友一样对待印度。相反，它必须像对待约旦、越南和其他许多不自由的伙伴一样对待印度。换句话说，它必须根据共同利益的现实与印度合作，而不是基于共同价值的希望。