The Mind Wins!
March 4, 1993 issue 1993年3月4日的期刊
Reviewed:
The Rediscovery of the Mind 心灵的重新发现
by John Searle 由约翰·西尔撰写
MIT Press, 270 pp., $22.50 麻省理工学院出版社，270页，22.50美元。
According to a widely held view, the brain is a giant computer and the relation of the human mind to the human brain is like that of a computer program to the electronic hardware on which it runs. The philosopher John Searle, a dragon-slayer by temperament, has set out to show that this claim, together with the materialist tradition underlying it, is nonsense, for reasons some of which are obvious and some more subtle. Elaborating arguments that he and others have made over the past twenty years, he attacks most of the cognitive science establishment and then offers a theory of his own about the nature of mind and its relation to the physical world. If this pungent book is right, the computer model of the mind is not just doubtful or imperfect, but totally and glaringly absurd. 根据广泛流传的观点，大脑就像一台巨大的计算机，人类心智与人脑的关系就像计算机程序与电子硬件的关系一样。哲学家约翰·西尔认为这种观点及其背后的唯物主义传统是荒谬的，他试图通过一些明显的和更微妙的理由来证明这一点。他详细阐述了他和其他人在过去二十年中提出的论点，批评了大部分认知科学界，并提出了自己关于心智本质及其与物质世界的关系的理论。如果这本刺激性的书是正确的，那么心智的计算机模型不仅仅是可疑或不完善，而是完全荒谬和明显荒谬的。
His main reasons are two. First, the essence of the mind is consciousness: all mental phenomena are either actually or potentially conscious. And none of the familiar materialist analyses of mind can deal with conscious experience: they leave it out, either by not talking about it or by identifying it with something else that has nothing to do with consciousness. Second, computers which do not have minds can be described as running programs, processing information, manipulating symbols, answering questions, and so on only because they are so constructed that people, who do have minds, can interpret their physical operations in those ways. To ascribe a computer program to the brain implies a mind that can interpret what the brain does; so the idea of explaining the mind in terms of such a program is incoherent. 他的主要理由有两个。首先，心灵的本质是意识：所有的心理现象都是实际上或潜在地意识的。而且，所有熟悉的唯物主义对心灵的分析都无法处理意识体验：它们要么不谈论它，要么将其与与意识无关的其他事物等同起来。其次，没有心灵的计算机只能被描述为运行程序、处理信息、操作符号、回答问题等，仅仅是因为它们被构造成人类（有心灵的存在）可以以这些方式解释它们的物理操作。将计算机程序归因于大脑意味着需要一个能够解释大脑所做之事的心灵；因此，用这样一个程序来解释心灵的想法是不连贯的。
1.
Searle’s book begins with a lucid critical survey of the different views now circulating about the relation of the mind to the body. The mind-body problem was posed in its modern form only in the seventeenth century, with the emergence of the scientific conception of the physical world on which we are now all brought up. According to that conception, the physical world is in itself colorless, odorless, and tasteless, and can be described mathematically by laws governing the behavior of particles and fields of force in space and time. Certain physical phenomena cause us to have perceptual experience—we see color and hear sound—but the qualities we experience do not belong to the light and sound waves described by physics. We get at the physical reality by “peeling off” the subjective effects on our senses and the way things appear from a human point of view, consigning those to the mind, and trying to construct an objective theory of the world outside our minds that will systematically explain the experimental observations and measurements on which all scrupulous observers agree. However radically the content of contemporary physics and its conception of the role of the observer may differ from that of classical physics, it is still in search of a theory of the external world in this sense. Searle的书以对当前关于心灵与身体关系的不同观点的明晰批判性调查开始。心灵-身体问题仅在17世纪以其现代形式提出，随着科学对我们现在所接受的物质世界的概念的出现。根据这个概念，物质世界本身是无色、无味、无味的，并且可以通过描述空间和时间中的粒子和力场的行为的数学规律来描述。某些物理现象导致我们有感知体验-我们看到颜色和听到声音-但我们所经历的质量并不属于物理学描述的光和声波。我们通过“剥离”我们的感官上的主观效果和事物从人类角度出现的方式来了解物理现实，将这些归于心灵，并试图构建一个关于我们心灵之外的世界的客观理论，以系统地解释所有严谨观察者所同意的实验观察和测量结果。 然而，无论当代物理学的内容以及对观察者角色的理解与古典物理学有多大的不同，它仍然在寻求一种关于外部世界的理论。
But having produced such a conception by removing the appearances from the physical world and lodging them in the mind, science is faced with the problem of how to complete the picture by finding a place in the world for our minds themselves, with their perceptual experiences, thoughts, desires, scientific theory-construction, and much else that is not described by physics. The reason this is called the mind-body problem is that what goes on in our minds evidently depends on what happens to and in our bodies, especially our brains; yet our bodies are part of the “external” world—i.e., the world external to our minds—which physical science describes. Our bodies are elaborate physical structures built of molecules, and physics and chemistry would presumably give the most accurate description of everything they do or undergo. 然而，通过将外部世界的表象剥离并置于心灵中，科学创造了这样一个概念，但随之而来的问题是如何在世界中找到一个位置，来容纳我们的心灵本身，以及它们的感知经验、思维、欲望、科学理论构建等等，这些都无法被物理学所描述。这被称为心灵-身体问题的原因在于，我们心灵中发生的事情显然取决于我们的身体发生和内部发生的事情，尤其是我们的大脑；然而，我们的身体是“外部”世界的一部分，即相对于我们的心灵而言的世界，而物理科学对其进行了描述。我们的身体是由分子构建的复杂物理结构，物理学和化学可能会给出关于它们所做或经历的最准确的描述。
Descartes famously thought that if you considered carefully the nature of outer physical reality and the nature of inner mental reality (as exemplified by your own mind), you could not help seeing that these had to be two different kinds of things, however closely they might be bound together: a mind and its thoughts and experiences just couldn’t be constructed out of physical parts like molecules in the way that the heart or the brain evidently can be. Descartes’s conclusion that mental life goes on in a nonphysical entity, the soul, is known as dualism—sometimes “substance” dualism, to distinguish it from “property” dualism, which is the view that though there is no soul distinct from the body, mental phenomena (like tasting salt or feeling thirsty) involve properties of the person or his brain that are not physical. 笛卡尔著名地认为，如果你仔细考虑外在物质现实的本质和内在心理现实的本质（如你自己的思维），你会发现这两者必定是不同的事物，尽管它们可能紧密地联系在一起：一个思维和它的想法和经验无法像心脏或大脑那样由物质部分（如分子）构成。笛卡尔得出的结论是，心理生活发生在一个非物质实体——灵魂中，这被称为二元论，有时也称为“实体”二元论，以区别于“属性”二元论，后者认为虽然没有与身体不同的灵魂，但心理现象（如尝盐或感到口渴）涉及到人或他的大脑的非物质属性。
The power of Descartes’s intuitive argument is considerable, but dualism of either kind is now a rare view among philosophers,1 most of whom accept some kind of materialism. They believe that everything there is and everything that happens in the world must be capable of description by physical science. Moreover they find direct evidence that this can be done even for the mind in the intimate dependence of mental on neurophysiological processes, about which much has been learned since the seventeenth century. And they find indirect evidence, from the remarkable success of the application of physics and chemistry to other aspects of life, from digestion to heredity. Consequently most efforts to complete the scientific world view in a materialist form have proceeded by some sort of reduction of the mental to the physical—where the physical, by definition, is that which can be described in nonmental terms. 笛卡尔直觉论的力量是相当可观的，但无论哪种形式的二元论在哲学家中现在都是罕见的观点，其中大多数人接受某种形式的唯物主义。他们相信世界上存在的一切和发生的一切都必须能够通过物理科学来描述。此外，他们通过心理与神经生理过程的密切依赖找到了直接证据，关于这一点，自17世纪以来已经学到了很多。他们还从物理学和化学在生活的其他方面（从消化到遗传）的显著成功中找到了间接证据。因此，大多数以唯物主义形式完成科学世界观的努力都是通过将心理降低到物理的某种方式来进行的——其中物理的定义是可以用非心理术语来描述的东西。
A reduction is the analysis of something identified at one level of description in the terms of another, more fundamental level of description—allowing us to say that the first really is nothing but the second: water can be described as consisting of H2O molecules, heat as molecular motion, light as electromagnetic radiation. These are reductions of the macroscopic physical to the microscopic physical, and they have the following noteworthy features: 1) They provide not just external information about the causes or conditions of the reduced phenomenon, but an internal account of what water, heat, and light really are. 2) They work only because we have distinguished the perceptual appearances of the macroscopic phenomena—the way water and heat feel, the way light looks—from the properties that are being reduced. When we say heat consists of molecular motion, we mean that heat as an intrinsic property of hot objects is nothing but the motion of their molecules. Such objects produce the feeling of heat in us when we touch them, but we have expressly not identified that feeling with molecular motion—indeed the reduction depends on our having left it out. 简化是将某个在一个描述层面上被确定的事物分析为另一个更基本的描述层面，从而使我们能够说第一个实际上只不过是第二个：水可以被描述为由H2O分子组成，热可以被描述为分子运动，光可以被描述为电磁辐射。这些是宏观物理到微观物理的简化，它们具有以下值得注意的特点：1）它们不仅提供关于简化现象的原因或条件的外部信息，还提供了关于水、热和光的内部描述。2）它们之所以有效，是因为我们区分了宏观现象的感知外观（水和热的感觉，光的外观）与被简化的属性。当我们说热由分子运动组成时，我们的意思是热作为热物体的固有属性实际上就是其分子的运动。当我们触摸这些物体时，它们会给我们带来热感，但我们明确地没有将这种感觉与分子运动等同起来——事实上，简化依赖于我们将其排除在外。
Now how could mental phenomena be reduced to something described entirely in physical, nonmental terms? In this case, obviously, we cannot leave out all effects on the mind, since that is precisely what is to be reduced. What is needed to complete the materialist world picture is some scheme of the form, “Mental phenomena—thoughts, feelings, sensations, desires, perceptions, etc.—are nothing but…,” where the blank is to be filled in by a description that is either explicitly physical or uses only terms that can apply to what is entirely physical.2 The various attempts to carry out this apparently impossible task, and the arguments to show that they have failed, make up the history of the philosophy of mind during the past fifty years. 现在，心理现象如何能够被简化为完全用物理的、非心理的术语来描述的东西呢？在这种情况下，显然我们不能忽略对心灵的所有影响，因为这正是要被简化的东西。为了完善唯物主义的世界观，需要一种形式为“心理现象——思想、感受、知觉、欲望、感知等——不过是……”的方案，其中空白处应填入一个明确的物理描述，或者只使用可以适用于完全物理的术语。 2 这个明显不可能的任务的各种尝试，以及证明它们失败的论证，构成了过去五十年来心灵哲学的历史。
Searle’s account of that history begins with behaviorism, the view that mental concepts do not refer to anything inside us and that each type of mental state can be identified with a disposition of the organism to behave observably in certain ways under certain physical conditions. When this view began to look too much like a bald denial of the existence of the mind, some philosophers put forward identity theories, according to which mental processes are identical with brain processes in the same way that light is identical with electromagnetic radiation. But identity theories were left with the problem of explaining in nonmental terms what it means to say of a particular brain process that it is a thought or a sensation. After all, this can’t mean only that it is a certain kind of neurophysiological process. And given the aim of these theories, it couldn’t mean that the brain process has some mental effect. The proposed solution was a revival of behaviorism in a new form: Thirst, for example, was identified not with a disposition to drink, but with a brain state; but that particular brain state’s being identical with thirst was now said to consist simply in the fact that it was typically caused by dehydration and that it typically caused a disposition to drink. In this way it was thought that the identification of mental states with brain states could avoid all reference to non-physical features. Searle对这段历史的描述始于行为主义，即心理概念并不指涉我们内在的任何东西，而每种心理状态都可以被认定为有机体在特定物理条件下以可观察的方式表现出来的倾向。当这种观点开始看起来太像对心灵存在的光秃秃否定时，一些哲学家提出了同一论，即心理过程与脑过程的同一性，就像光与电磁辐射的同一性一样。但同一论面临着一个问题，即如何用非心理的术语解释特定脑过程是思维或感觉的意义。毕竟，这不能仅仅意味着它是某种神经生理过程。而且，考虑到这些理论的目标，它也不能意味着脑过程具有某种心理效应。 提出的解决方案是以一种新形式复兴行为主义：例如，口渴不再被认为是一种喝水的倾向，而是与大脑状态相关联；而这种特定的大脑状态之所以与口渴相同，是因为它通常是由脱水引起的，并且通常会引起喝水的倾向。通过这种方式，人们认为将心理状态与大脑状态的认同避免了对非物质特征的任何参考。
These “causal behaviorist” analyses were eventually succeeded by a more technical theory called functionalism, according to which mental concepts cannot be linked to behavior and circumstances individually but only as part of a single interconnected network. The behavior caused by thirst, for example, depends on the rest of a person’s mental condition—his beliefs about where water is to be found and whether it is safe to drink, the strength of his desires to live or die, and so forth. Each mental state is a part of an integrated system which controls the organism’s interaction with its environment; it is only by analyzing the role played by such states as thirst, pain, other kinds of sensation, belief, emotion, and desire, within the total system, that one can accurately describe their connection to behavior and external circumstances. Such a system may still permit mental states to be identified with brain states, provided the latter have causal or functional roles of the kind specified by the theory (still to be constructed) of how the integrated system works. Finally, functionalism led to what Searle calls Strong AI (Strong Artificial Intelligence)—the identification of mental states with computational states of a computer program which controls the organism’s behavior—a program which is physically realized in the hardware (or wetware) of the brain.3 这些“因果行为主义”分析最终被一种更为技术性的理论所取代，称为功能主义。根据功能主义，心理概念不能单独与行为和环境联系起来，而只能作为一个相互连接的整体网络的一部分。例如，渴望引起的行为取决于一个人的其他心理状态——他对水源的信念和是否安全饮用的判断、他生存或死亡欲望的强度等等。每个心理状态都是一个整合系统的一部分，它控制着有机体与环境的互动；只有通过分析渴望、疼痛、其他感觉、信念、情绪和欲望等状态在整个系统中所扮演的角色，才能准确描述它们与行为和外部环境的联系。这样的系统可能仍然允许将心理状态与脑状态相对应，前提是后者在理论（尚待构建）中具有因果或功能角色，以解释整合系统的工作方式。 最后，功能主义导致了西尔所称的强人工智能（Strong Artificial Intelligence）——将心理状态与控制生物行为的计算机程序的计算状态进行等同，这个程序在大脑的硬件（或湿件）中得到了物理实现。 3
All these theories attempt to reduce the mind to one or another aspect of a world that can be fully described by physics—the world of particles and fields. They have not been worked out in detail; they are just hopeful descriptions of the kind of thing a theory of the mind would have to be, together with some extremely sketchy examples. While each new proposal has been criticized by defenders of alternative reductionist accounts, Searle argues that there is one big thing wrong with all of them: they leave out consciousness. 所有这些理论都试图将心灵归纳为可以完全由物理学描述的世界的某个方面——粒子和场的世界。它们尚未详细阐述，只是对心灵理论可能的描述的希望性陈述，以及一些极为粗略的例子。虽然每个新的提议都受到了替代性还原主义观点的辩护者的批评，西尔尔认为它们都有一个很大的问题：它们忽略了意识。
2.
No theory that leaves out consciousness can claim to be a theory of the mind, and no analysis of consciousness in nonmental terms is possible; therefore no materialistic reduction of the mental can succeed. Searle contends that none of these theories could possibly provide an account of what pain, hunger, belief, vision, etc. really are, because all they talk about is what is externally observable—the organism’s behavior and its causal structure—and a description of something exclusively in those terms fails to guarantee that it has any consciousness at all: each of these behaviorist, functionalist, or computational theories could be satisfied by an unconscious zombie of sufficient physical complexity. 没有一个排除了意识的理论能够声称自己是心灵的理论，也没有可能用非心理术语来分析意识；因此，任何唯物主义对心理的简化都不可能成功。西尔尔认为，这些理论都无法解释痛苦、饥饿、信念、视觉等真正的本质，因为它们只谈论外部可观察的行为和因果结构，而仅仅用这些术语描述的东西并不能保证它具有任何意识：行为主义、功能主义或计算理论都可以满足足够复杂的无意识僵尸的条件。
The crucial question is not “Under what conditions would we attribute mental states to other people?” but rather, “What is it that people actually have when they have mental states?” “What are mental phenomena?” as distinct from “How do we find out about them and how do they function causally in the life of the organism?” 关键问题不是“在什么条件下我们会将心理状态归因于他人？”而是“当人们拥有心理状态时，他们实际上拥有什么？”“心理现象是什么？”与“我们如何发现它们以及它们在生物体的生活中如何起因果作用？”是不同的问题
We attribute consciousness to other people and to animals on the basis of their behavior, but this is simply evidence of consciousness rather than proof of it, and it has to be supplemented by evidence of physiological similarity: Since we believe in the uniformity of nature, we naturally infer that creatures who behave similarly to us and have sense organs and nervous systems physically similar to ours also have conscious experiences of some kind. But, Searle argues, no quantity of facts about physical behavior or functional organization by themselves entail that a system is conscious at all—and any theory which claims, for example, that vision is “nothing but” a certain state of the organism must, to be adequate, have the consequence that if the organism is in that state, it can’t fail to be conscious. Otherwise it will leave out the most important thing about vision, and, whatever its other merits, won’t qualify as an account of what vision is. 我们根据他们的行为将意识归因于其他人和动物，但这只是意识的证据，而不是证明，它必须通过生理相似性的证据来补充：由于我们相信自然的一致性，我们自然推断与我们行为相似并且具有与我们相似的感觉器官和神经系统的生物也具有某种意识体验。但是，西尔尔（Searle）认为，任何关于物理行为或功能组织的事实都不能单独证明一个系统是否有意识，而且任何声称视觉“仅仅是”有机体的某种状态的理论，为了足够完备，必须得出这样的结论：如果有机体处于该状态，它就不可能没有意识。否则，它将忽略视觉的最重要的事情，并且无论它的其他优点如何，都不能作为对视觉是什么的解释。
Not only do materialist reductions fail to imply that the system is conscious; it is clear in advance that no further development along the same lines, no added structural or behavioral complications, could do so. The reason is that there is a crucial difference between conscious phenomena and behavioral or physiological phenomena that makes the former irreducible to the latter: consciousness is, in Searle’s terms, “ontologically subjective.” That is, its essential features cannot be described entirely from an external, third-person point of view. Even the physiological description of what goes on inside the skull is external in this sense: it is described from outside. It is not enough to summarize the third-person observations, behavioral or physiological, that lead us to ascribe conscious mental states to others. The first-person point of view, which reveals what a conscious mental state is like for its subject, is indispensable. 物质主义的简化并不能暗示系统具有意识；事先就清楚，沿着同样的思路进一步发展，增加结构或行为上的复杂性也无法实现这一点。原因在于，意识现象与行为或生理现象之间存在着关键的区别，使得前者无法简化为后者：根据西尔的说法，意识是“本体论上的主观性”。也就是说，它的基本特征无法完全从外部、第三人称的角度来描述。即使是对头脑内部发生的生理过程的描述，在这个意义上也是外部的：它是从外部描述的。仅仅总结第三人称的观察，无论是行为还是生理方面的观察，都不能让我们归因于他人具有意识的心理状态。第一人称的视角，揭示了一个意识心理状态对其主体来说是什么样子，是不可或缺的。
This becomes clear when we ask, What is consciousness? Though we can describe certain of its features, and identify more specific types of mental phenomena as instances, it is so basic that it can’t be defined in terms of anything else. You, reader, are conscious at this very moment, and your conscious condition includes such things as the way this page looks to you; the feel of the paper between your fingers, the shirt on your back, and the chair on which you’re sitting; the sounds you hear of music or surf or police sirens in the background; and your experience of reading this sentence. Searle’s claim is that no amount of third-person analysis, whether behavioral, causal, or functional, could possibly tell us what these experiences are in themselves—what they consist of, as distinguished from their causes and effects. This is perfectly obvious because subjective facts about what it’s like for someone to be in a certain condition—what it’s like from his point of view—can’t be identified with facts about how things are, not from anyone’s point of view or for anyone, but just in themselves. Facts about your external behavior or the electrical activity or functional organization of your brain may be closely connected with your conscious experiences, but they are not facts about what it’s like for you to hear a police siren.4 当我们问“意识是什么？”时，这一点变得清晰起来。虽然我们可以描述它的某些特征，并将更具体的心理现象识别为实例，但它是如此基本，以至于无法用其他事物来定义。亲爱的读者，你此刻正处于有意识的状态，你的意识状态包括这一页对你的外观；你手指间纸张的触感，背后的衬衫和你坐在的椅子；你听到的音乐、海浪声或背景中的警笛声；以及你阅读这句话的体验。西尔的观点是，无论是行为、因果还是功能的第三人称分析，都无法告诉我们这些经历本身是什么，即它们由什么组成，与它们的原因和影响有何区别。这是显而易见的，因为关于某人处于某种状态时的主观事实——从他的角度来看是什么样子——无法与关于事物如何，不论从任何人的角度或为任何人，而只是它们自身的事实相等。 关于你的外部行为或大脑的电活动或功能组织的事实可能与你的意识体验密切相关，但它们并不是关于你听到警车警笛时的感受的事实。 4
Searle believes that the persistence of materialistic reductionism in the face of its evident falsity requires explanation. He likens it to the constant repetition by a compulsive neurotic of the same destructive pattern of behavior; and he hopes that by bringing to light its underlying causes he can break the hold of the compulsion. It is evident, both from what they say and from what they do, that reductionists are convinced in advance that some materialist theory of the mind must be correct: they just have to find it. This assumption is part of a scientific world view to which they can see no alternative. But underlying the assumption, according to Searle, are two crucial misconceptions. The first is that we have to choose between materialism and dualism: 塞尔认为，在明显错误的情况下，唯物主义还能持续存在需要解释。他将其比作强迫性神经症者不断重复相同破坏性行为模式，他希望通过揭示其潜在原因来打破这种强迫的束缚。从他们的言行来看，很明显唯物主义者事先相信某种唯物主义的心灵理论一定是正确的，他们只是需要找到它。这种假设是他们所看不到其他选择的科学世界观的一部分。但塞尔认为，在这种假设之下存在着两个关键的误解。第一个误解是我们必须在唯物主义和二元论之间做出选择：
What I want to insist on, ceaselessly, is that one can accept the obvious facts of physics—for example, that the world is made up entirely of physical particles in fields of force—without at the same time denying the obvious facts about our own experiences—for example, that we are all conscious and that our conscious states have quite specific ir-reducible phenomenological [i.e., subjective] properties. The mistake is to suppose that these two theses are inconsistent, and that mistake derives from accepting the presuppositions behind the traditional vocabulary. My view is emphatically not a form of dualism. I reject both property and substance dualism; but precisely for the reasons that I reject dualism, I reject materialism and monism as well. The deep mistake is to suppose that one must choose between these views. 我想要坚持的是，一个人可以毫不停歇地接受物理学中的明显事实，例如世界完全由物质粒子和力场构成，同时也不否认我们自身经历的明显事实，例如我们都有意识，并且我们的意识状态具有特定的不可简化的现象学（即主观）属性。错误在于认为这两个命题是不一致的，而这个错误源于接受传统词汇背后的假设。我的观点绝对不是一种二元论。我拒绝财产二元论和实体二元论；但正是因为我拒绝二元论，我也同样拒绝唯物主义和唯一论。深层的错误在于认为我们必须在这些观点之间做出选择。
Once you accept our world view the only obstacle to granting consciousness its status as a biological feature of organisms is the outmoded dualistic/materialistic assumption that the “mental” character of consciousness makes it impossible for it to be a “physical” property. 一旦您接受我们的世界观，唯一阻碍意识被视为生物特征的障碍就是过时的二元论/唯物主义假设，即意识的“心理”特性使其无法成为“物理”属性。
This radical thesis, that consciousness is a physical property of the brain in spite of its subjectivity, and that it is irreducible to any other physical properties, is the metaphysical heart of Searle’s position. The point here, however, is that Searle contends that materialists are drawn to implausible forms of psychophysical reduction because they assume that if mental states cannot be explained in such terms, then the inescapable alternative is dualism: they would then have to admit that nonphysical substances or properties are basic features of reality. And the fear of dualism, with its religious and spiritualist and otherwise unscientific associations, drives them to embrace reductionist materialism at any intellectual cost: “Materialism is thus in a sense the finest flower of dualism.” 这个激进的论题认为，意识是大脑的物理属性，尽管它具有主观性，并且它不能被归纳为其他任何物理属性。这是西尔的立场的形而上学核心。然而，关键在于，西尔认为唯物主义者倾向于采用不可信的心理物理还原形式，因为他们假设如果心理状态不能用这些术语来解释，那么不可避免的选择就是二元论：他们将不得不承认非物质的物质或属性是现实的基本特征。对于二元论的恐惧，以及它与宗教、灵性和其他非科学的联系，驱使他们以任何智力代价来拥抱还原主义唯物主义：“从某种意义上说，唯物主义是二元论的最美丽的花朵。”
To escape from this bind, says Searle, we have to free ourselves of the urge to ask whether there are one or two ultimate kinds of things and properties. We should not start counting in the first place. 塞尔认为，为了摆脱这个困境，我们必须摆脱询问是否存在一种或两种终极事物和属性的冲动。我们首先不应该开始计数。
He is absolutely right about the fear of dualism (indeed, I believe he himself is not immune to its effects). Its most bizarre manifestation is yet another theory, called “eliminative” materialism. This is the view that, because mental states can’t be accommodated within the world described by physics, they don’t exist—just as witches and ghosts don’t exist. They can be dismissed as postulates of a primitive theory customarily referred to as “folk psychology”5—about which Sir Peter Strawson, I am told, has remarked, “Ah yes, the province of such simple folk as Flaubert, Proust, and Henry James.” Searle patiently pulverizes this view, but his real point is that the entire materialist tradition is in truth eliminative: all materialist theories deny the reality of the mind, but most of them disguise the fact (from themselves as well as from others) by identifying the mind with something else. 他对二元论的恐惧是完全正确的（实际上，我相信他自己也无法免疫其影响）。最奇怪的表现是另一种理论，被称为“消除性”唯物主义。这种观点认为，由于心理状态无法被物理学所描述的世界所容纳，它们并不存在，就像巫婆和鬼魂一样不存在。它们可以被视为一个被称为“民间心理学”的原始理论的假设，关于这一点，我听说彼得·斯特劳森爵士曾说过：“啊，是的，这是弗洛贝尔、普鲁斯特和亨利·詹姆斯这样简单人民的领域。”西尔耐心地击碎了这种观点，但他真正的观点是整个唯物主义传统实际上是消除性的：所有唯物主义理论都否认心灵的存在，但其中大多数都通过将心灵与其他事物等同起来（无论是对自己还是对他人）来掩盖这一事实。
The second crucial misconception behind the compulsive search for materialist theories, according to Searle, is a simple but enormously destructive mistake about objectivity: 根据西尔认为，追求唯物主义理论的强迫性搜索背后的第二个关键误解是关于客观性的一个简单但极具破坏性的错误
There is a persistent confusion between the claim that we should try as much as possible to eliminate personal subjective prejudices from the search for truth and the claim that the real world contains no elements that are irreducibly subjective. And this confusion in turn is based on a confusion between the epistemological sense of the subjective/objective distinction, and the ontological sense. Epistemically, the distinction marks different degrees of independence of claims from the vagaries of special values, personal prejudices, points of view, and emotions. Ontologically, the distinction marks different categories of empirical reality. 在追求真理的过程中，有一个持久的混淆，即我们应尽可能地消除个人主观偏见的主张与真实世界中不存在不可约的主观元素的主张之间的混淆。而这种混淆又是基于对主观/客观区分的认识论意义和本体论意义之间的混淆。在认识论上，这种区分标志着不同程度的主张独立于特殊价值观、个人偏见、观点和情感的波动。在本体论上，这种区分标志着经验现实的不同类别。
This seems to me entirely convincing, and very important. Science must of course strive for epistemic objectivity—objective knowledge—by using methods that compensate for differences in points of view and that permit different observers to arrive at the same conception of what is the case. But it is a gross confusion to conclude from this that nothing which has or includes a point of view can be an object of scientific investigation. Subjective points of view are themselves parts of the real world, and if they and their properties are to be described adequately, their ontologically subjective character—the subjectivity of their nature—must be acknowledged. Furthermore, this can be done, in the epistemic sense, objectively: Although only you are now experiencing the look of the page in front of you, others can know that you are, and can know a good deal about what that experience is like for you. It is an objective truth that you are now having a certain subjective visual experience. 这对我来说完全令人信服，也非常重要。科学当然必须追求认识客观性——客观知识——通过使用能够弥补观点差异并使不同观察者得出相同概念的方法。但是，从这个结论中得出这样的混淆是错误的，即具有或包含观点的任何事物都不能成为科学研究的对象。主观观点本身就是现实世界的一部分，如果要充分描述它们及其属性，就必须承认它们的本体论主观性——它们的主观性质。此外，从认识论的角度来看，这是可以客观地实现的：虽然只有你现在正在经历眼前页面的外观，但其他人可以知道你正在经历这种体验，并且可以对你的体验有很多了解。你现在正在有一种特定的主观视觉体验，这是一个客观事实。
If we accept this distinction, the question becomes, How can we form an epistemically objective scientific conception of a world which contains not only the familiar ontologically objective facts described by physics, chemistry, and biology, but also the ontologically subjective facts of consciousness? And that brings us, finally, to Searle’s own view, which he calls “biological naturalism,” and which combines acceptance of the irreducible subjectivity of the mental with rejection of the dichotomy between mental and physical: 如果我们接受这个区分，问题就变成了，我们如何形成一个认识论客观的科学概念，来描述一个既包含物理、化学和生物学所描述的本体论客观事实，又包含意识的本体论主观事实的世界？最后，这就引出了西尔的观点，他称之为“生物本体论”，它既接受了心理的不可约简主观性，又拒绝了心理和物理之间的二分法
Consciousness…is a biological feature of human and certain animal brains. It is caused by neuro-biological processes and is as much part of the natural biological order as any other biological features such as photosynthesis, digestion, or mitosis. 意识是人类和某些动物大脑的生物特征。它是由神经生物学过程引起的，与其他生物特征（如光合作用、消化或有丝分裂）一样，是自然生物秩序的一部分。
And in spite of his antireductionism, he also writes as follows: 尽管他反对简化论，但他也写道：
Consciousness is a higher-level or emergent property of the brain in the utterly harmless sense of “higher-level” or “emergent” in which solidity is a higher-level emergent property of H2O molecules when they are in a lattice structure (ice), and liquidity is similarly a higher-level emergent property of H2O molecules when they are, roughly speaking, rolling around on each other (water). Consciousness is a mental, and therefore physical, property of the brain in the sense in which liquidity is a property of systems of molecules. 意识是大脑的一种高级或新兴属性，以完全无害的意义来说，就像固体是H 2 O分子在晶格结构（冰）中的一种高级新兴属性，液体是H 2 O分子在相互滚动（水）时的一种类似的高级新兴属性。意识是大脑的一种心理属性，因此也是一种物理属性，就像液体是分子系统的属性一样。
If this view could be clarified in a way that distinguished it from the alternatives, it would be a major addition to the possible answers to the mind-body problem. But I don’t think it can be. 如果能够以一种与其他观点有所区别的方式来阐明这个观点，那将成为解决心灵-身体问题的可能答案中的重要补充。但我不认为这是可能的。
Suppose we grant that states of consciousness are properties of the brain caused by, but not reducible to, its neural activity. This means that your brain, for instance, has a point of view of which all your current experiences are aspects. But what is the justification for calling these irreducibly subjective features of the brain physical? What would it even mean to call them physical? Certainly they are “higher-order” in the sense that they can be ascribed only to the system as a whole and not to its microscopic parts; they are also “emergent” in the sense of being explained only by the causal interactions of those parts. But however great the variety of physical phenomena may be, ontological objectivity is one of their central defining conditions; and as we have seen Searle insists that consciousness is ontologically subjective. 假设我们承认意识状态是大脑的属性，由其神经活动引起，但又不能简化为神经活动。这意味着，例如，你的大脑有一个观点，你当前的所有经验都是其方面。但是，将大脑的这些不可简化的主观特征称为物理的有何依据？这又意味着什么呢？当然，从“高阶”的意义上说，它们只能归因于整个系统，而不能归因于其微观部分；从“新兴”的意义上说，它们只能通过这些部分之间的因果相互作用来解释。但是，无论物理现象的多样性有多大，本体论客观性是它们的核心定义条件之一；正如我们所见，西尔坚持认为意识是本体论主观的。
Searle doesn’t say enough about this question. Perhaps he believes that if brains are made up of physical particles, it follows automatically that all their properties are physical. And he quotes a remark of Noam Chomsky that as soon as we come to understand anything, we call it “physical.” But if “physical” is in this sense merely an honorific term (another way I’ve heard Chomsky put the point), what is the metaphysical content of Searle’s claim that mental properties are physical, and his emphatic rejection of property dualism? He says, after all, that the ontological distinction between subjective and objective marks “different categories of empirical reality.” To say further that we are “left with a universe that contains an irreducibly subjective physical component as a component of physical reality” merely couches an essentially dualistic claim in language that expresses a strong aversion to dualism.6 Searle在这个问题上没有说得足够多。也许他认为，如果大脑由物质粒子组成，那么它们的所有属性自然就是物质的。他引用了诺姆·乔姆斯基的一句话，即我们一旦理解了任何事物，就称之为“物质的”。但是，如果“物质的”在这个意义上仅仅是一个尊称（我听乔姆斯基这样表达过），那么Searle声称心理属性是物质的，以及他强烈反对属性二元论的形而上学内容是什么呢？毕竟，他说主观和客观之间的本体论区别标志着“不同类别的经验现实”。进一步说，我们“留下了一个包含不可约简的主观物理成分作为物理现实组成部分的宇宙”，只是用表达对二元论强烈厌恶的语言掩盖了一个本质上的二元主义主张。
Perhaps we could adopt Searle’s use of the word “physical,” but the basic issue is more than verbal. It is the issue of how to construct an intelligible and complete scientific world view once we deny the reducibility of the mental to the nonmental. As Searle points out, we cannot do so by continuing on the path which physical science has followed since the seventeenth century, since that depended on excluding the mind of the observer from the world being observed and described. To propose that consciousness is an intrinsic subjective property of the brain caused by its neural activity is the first step on a different path—the right one, in my opinion. But there are large problems ahead, and they are not just empirical but philosophical. 也许我们可以采用西尔的“物理”一词，但基本问题不仅仅是言辞上的。这是一个关于如何构建一个可理解和完整的科学世界观的问题，一旦我们否认了心理与非心理之间的可还原性。正如西尔指出的那样，我们不能继续沿着自17世纪以来物理科学所走的道路前进，因为那种方式依赖于将观察者的心灵排除在被观察和描述的世界之外。提出意识是由大脑的神经活动引起的内在主观属性是走上一条不同道路的第一步，我认为这是正确的。但是，前方还有很多问题，而且这些问题不仅仅是经验上的，还有哲学上的。
Even if we learn a great deal more than we know now about the physiological causes of consciousness, it will not, as Searle is aware, make the relation of consciousness to the behavior of neurons analogous to the relation of liquidity to the behavior of H2O molecules. In the latter case the relation is transparent: We can see how liquidity is the logical result of the molecules “rolling around on each other” at the microscopic level. Nothing comparable is to be expected in the case of neurons, even though it is empirically evident that states of consciousness are the necessary consequences of neuronal activity. Searle has an interesting discussion of this difference, which he says results only from a limitation of our powers of conception: we can represent the necessary relation between the macro and micro levels of water since we picture them both from the outside; but we can’t do this with subjectivity, which we have to imagine from the inside, whether it is ours or someone else’s. I agree, but I believe this means we do not really understand the claim that mental states are states of the brain: We are still unable to form a conception of how consciousness arises in matter, even if we are certain that it does.7 即使我们对意识的生理原因了解比现在多得多，正如西尔所意识到的那样，这也不会使意识与神经元行为的关系类似于液体与H2O分子行为的关系。在后一种情况下，关系是透明的：我们可以看到液体如何是微观层面上分子“相互滚动”的逻辑结果。然而，在神经元的情况下，不会有类似的情况发生，尽管经验证明，意识状态是神经活动的必然结果。西尔对这种差异进行了有趣的讨论，他说这只是我们概念能力的限制所导致的：我们可以代表水的宏观和微观层面之间的必然关系，因为我们可以从外部描绘它们；但是我们无法做到这一点，对于主观性，我们必须从内部想象，无论是我们自己的还是别人的。 我同意，但我认为这意味着我们并不真正理解心理状态是大脑状态的说法：即使我们确信心理状态是大脑状态，我们仍然无法形成意识如何在物质中产生的概念。 7
3.
Searle’s second set of arguments against the computer model of mind depends on the specific nature of computers, and is more distinctively Searle’s own: it grows out of his long-standing concern with the theory of meaning and the “intentionality” of mental states—their capacity to mean something or refer to something outside themselves, and their consequent susceptibility to judgments of truth or falsity, correctness or incorrectness.8 塞尔的第二组反对计算机心智模型的论据取决于计算机的特定性质，并且更具塞尔自己的特色：它源于他长期以来对意义理论和心理状态的“有意向性”的关注——它们能够意味着某些事物或指向某些事物的能力，以及由此产生的对真实性或虚假性、正确性或错误性的判断的敏感性。
How is it possible for computers to answer the question we put to them—arithmetical questions, for example? The explanation has two parts. First, it is possible to formulate each of those questions by using a string of symbols—letters or numerals—selected from a short list and distinguished by their shapes, and to devise a finite set of rules for manipulating those symbols, which has the following property: if you start with the string corresponding to the question, and follow the rules for moving, removing, and adding symbols, you will arrive, after a finite series of uniquely determined steps, at a point where the rules tell you to stop; and the last string you have produced will correspond to the answer:9 you only have to read it. But to follow the rules for manipulating the symbols, you don’t have to know what they mean, or whether they mean anything: you just have to identify their shapes. 计算机如何能够回答我们提出的问题，比如算术问题？解释有两个部分。首先，我们可以通过使用一系列符号（字母或数字）从一个短列表中选择，并通过它们的形状进行区分，来表达这些问题。我们可以设计一套有限的规则来操作这些符号，这些规则具有以下特性：如果你从与问题对应的字符串开始，并按照规则移动、删除和添加符号，经过一系列唯一确定的步骤后，你将到达一个规则告诉你停止的点；而你产生的最后一个字符串将对应于答案：你只需要阅读它。但是，要遵循操作符号的规则，你不需要知道它们的意义，或者它们是否有任何意义：你只需要识别它们的形状。
Such rules are called rules of syntax (as opposed to rules of semantics, which you need to interpret a string as meaning something). The beauty of it is that we could train someone to do long division, for example, completely mechanically, using a set of rules and tables, without his knowing that the symbols he was writing down represented numbers or anything at all; but if he followed the syntactic rules, he would come up with what we (but not he) could read as the answer.10 这样的规则被称为语法规则（与语义规则相对，语义规则用于解释字符串的含义）。它的美妙之处在于，我们可以训练某人完全机械地进行长除法，例如，使用一套规则和表格，而他并不知道他写下的符号代表数字或任何其他东西；但是如果他遵循语法规则，他会得出我们（但不是他）可以读作答案的结果。 10
The second part of the explanation is that there are, besides writing on paper, different ways of encoding arithmetic in a set of symbols and syntactic rules, and, for some of those ways, it is possible to design physical machines to carry out mechanically all the steps in juggling the symbols that the rules prescribe. Instead of a person following the syntactic rules mechanically without knowing what the symbols mean, a physical mechanism can carry out the same operations on the symbols automatically. But note, not only does this mechanism not know what the symbols mean: it doesn’t even know, as our semantically deprived scribe did, that it is following rules for their manipulation, syntactic rules. It doesn’t know anything—in fact it isn’t following rules at all, but is just functioning in accordance with the laws of physics, in ways that clever engineers have designed to permit us to interpret the results both syntactically and semantically. 解释的第二部分是，除了纸上书写之外，还有不同的方式来编码一组符号和句法规则中的算术运算。对于其中的一些方式，可以设计物理机器来机械地执行符号操作的所有步骤，这些操作是由规则规定的。物理机制可以自动地对符号进行相同的操作，而不是一个人机械地遵循句法规则而不知道符号的含义。但请注意，这个机制不仅不知道符号的含义，它甚至不知道像我们那个语义贫乏的抄写员一样，它正在遵循符号操作的规则，即句法规则。它一无所知，事实上它根本不遵循规则，而只是按照物理定律的方式运作，这是聪明的工程师们设计出来的，使我们能够在句法和语义上解释结果。
Searle’s well-known “Chinese room” argument described a conscious person who, without knowing Chinese, follows rules for manipulating Chinese characters and puts together sentences intelligible to people who know Chinese. The point being made against the computer model of mind was that syntax alone can’t yield semantics.11 In The Rediscovery of the Mind he extends the argument to show that physics alone can’t yield syntax. Following rules, even purely syntactic rules, is an irreducibly mental process—an “intentional” process in which the meaning of the rules themselves must be grasped by a conscious mind. It is not just a matter of regularity in physical behavior: 塞尔（Searle）著名的“中文房间”论证描述了一个有意识的人，他不懂中文，但按照操作中文字符的规则组合出对懂中文的人来说有意义的句子。这个论证针对的是计算机心智模型，即仅仅通过语法无法产生语义。在《心智的重新发现》一书中，他进一步扩展了这个论证，以表明仅仅通过物理学无法产生语法。遵循规则，即使是纯粹的语法规则，也是一种不可简化的心智过程，一种“有意识”的过程，其中规则本身的意义必须被有意识的心智所理解。这不仅仅是物理行为的规律性问题：
A physical state of a system is a computational state only relative to the assignment to that state of some computational role, function, or interpretation….notions such as computation, algorithm, and program do not name intrinsic physical features of systems: Computational states are not discovered within the physics, they are assigned to the physics. 一个系统的物理状态只是相对于对该状态的某种计算角色、函数或解释的赋值而言的计算状态……计算、算法和程序等概念并不是系统固有的物理特征的名称：计算状态并非在物理学中发现，而是赋予物理学的。
The aim of natural science is to discover and characterize features that are intrinsic to the natural world. By its own definitions of computation and cognition, there is no way that computational cognitive science could ever be a natural science, because computation is not an intrinsic feature of the world. It is assigned relative to observers. (italics in original) 自然科学的目标是发现和描述自然世界固有的特征。根据计算和认知的定义，计算认知科学永远无法成为一门自然科学，因为计算不是世界固有的特征，而是相对于观察者而言的。
Searle’s distinction between what is intrinsic to the thing observed and what is relative to an observer or interpreter is a fundamental one. He argues that intrinsic intentionality—that is, the capacity for grasping the meaning of statements and consciously following rules—occurs only in minds. Words on a page or electrical resistances in a computer chip can be said to mean something, or to obey rules of grammar or arithmetic, only in the derivative sense that our minds can interpret them that way, in virtue of their arrangement. This means that the claim that the brain is a computer would imply that the brain has intentionality and follows rules of computation not intrinsically but only relative to the interpretation of its user. And who is the user supposed to be? If the brain is a computer, it does not have intrinsic intentionality. If it has intrinsic intentionality, it must be more than a computer. Searle chooses the second alternative. He also argues that those theories which try to construe the brain as a computer always surreptitiously assume a mind or “homunculus” as its interpreter. 塞尔尔（Searle）对所观察事物的本质和相对于观察者或解释者的区别是一个基本的区分。他认为，内在的意向性——也就是理解陈述的意义和有意识地遵循规则的能力——只存在于思维中。纸上的文字或计算机芯片中的电阻可以说有意义，或者遵循语法或算术规则，只是因为我们的思维可以根据它们的排列方式以这种方式解释它们。这意味着大脑是一台计算机的说法将暗示大脑具有意向性，并遵循计算规则，但这种意向性并非内在的，而只是相对于其用户的解释而言。那么用户应该是谁呢？如果大脑是一台计算机，它就没有内在的意向性。如果它具有内在的意向性，那么它必须超越计算机的范畴。塞尔尔选择了第二种选择。他还认为，那些试图将大脑解释为计算机的理论总是偷偷地假设了一个心智或“小人”作为其解释者。
There is a lot more to this argument, and though I find its negative conclusions persuasive, questions I have not touched on could be raised about Searle’s positive theory of intrinsic intentionality, which is meant to be consistent with his biological naturalism. As with consciousness, it remains extremely difficult to see how intrinsic intentionality could be a property of the physical organism. But instead of pursuing these questions here, I will turn to Searle’s views about the unconscious and its relation to consciousness, for these serve to bring together the two parts of the argument. 这个论点还有很多内容，虽然我认为它的负面结论具有说服力，但关于西尔的内在意向性积极理论，也可以提出一些我没有涉及到的问题，这个理论旨在与他的生物自然主义保持一致。与意识一样，很难看出内在意向性如何成为物理有机体的属性。但是，我不打算在这里追究这些问题，而是转向西尔关于无意识及其与意识的关系的观点，因为这些观点有助于将论点的两个部分联系起来。
Searle has put great weight on the claim that subjective consciousness is not reducible to anything else. But most of our mental states are not conscious. Take all the beliefs and hopes and intentions you may have but are not thinking about right now—the belief that there’s a leaning tower in Pisa, for example. It just became conscious, but you’ve probably believed it for years. If such beliefs can exist unconsciously, then consciousness is not an essential feature of mental life, and it must be possible for intentional mental states to be embodied in a purely material brain. So it could be argued that even for those mental states which are conscious, their subjective, experienced character is not essential for their intentionality. Perhaps consciousness is just a kind of subjective “tint” that sometimes gets added to the truly functional black and white of mental states so that a theory of mind could dismiss consciousness as inessential. 塞尔一直强调主观意识无法还原为其他任何东西。但我们大部分的心理状态并非意识到的。拿你可能有但此刻并未思考的所有信念、希望和意图来说——比如比萨斜塔的存在。它刚刚变得意识到，但你可能已经相信它多年了。如果这样的信念可以无意识地存在，那么意识就不是心理生活的本质特征，而有意识的心理状态必须能够在纯粹的物质大脑中体现。因此，可以认为即使对于那些有意识的心理状态，它们的主观体验特征对于它们的意向性来说并非必要的。也许意识只是一种主观的“色调”，有时会添加到心理状态的真正功能性的黑白之中，以便心灵理论可以将意识视为非必要的。
Here is Searle’s reply to the suggestion: 这是Searle对这个建议的回复：
We understand the notion of an unconscious mental state only as a possible content of consciousness, only as the sort of thing that, though not conscious, and perhaps impossible to bring to consciousness for various reasons [such as repression], is nonetheless the sort of thing that could be or could have been conscious. 我们只将无意识的心理状态理解为意识的可能内容，只将其视为一种虽然不具备意识，可能因为各种原因（如压抑）而无法被意识到的东西，但仍然是一种可能是或可能曾经是意识的东西。
He calls this the “connection principle”; his argument for it is that even unconscious mental states must have a distinctively subjective character to qualify as beliefs, thoughts, desires, etc. To be about anything, and therefore true or false, right or wrong, a state must belong at least potentially to the point of view of some subject. Searle acknowledges that it was a neurophysiological state of your brain that made it true two hours ago that you believed that there was a leaning tower in Pisa; but he argues that neurophysiology alone cannot qualify that state as a belief, because no physiological description by itself implies that the brain state has any intentionality or meaning at all—even if we add to the description an account of the physical behavior it might cause. His conclusion is that neurophysiological states can be assigned intentionality only derivatively, in virtue of the conscious states they are capable of producing: 他将这称为“连接原则”；他的论点是，即使是无意识的心理状态也必须具有独特的主观特征才能被视为信念、思想、欲望等。要成为关于任何事物的状态，从而具有真实或虚假、对或错的性质，这个状态必须至少潜在地属于某个主体的观点。西尔承认，两个小时前你相信比萨斜塔的事实是由你大脑的神经生理状态决定的；但他认为，仅凭神经生理学的描述不能将这种状态归类为信念，因为仅凭生理学的描述本身并不意味着大脑状态具有任何意向性或意义——即使我们在描述中加入它可能引起的物理行为的说明。他的结论是，神经生理状态只能通过它们能够产生的意识状态间接地被赋予意向性：
The ontology of the unconscious consists in objective features of the brain capable of causing subjective conscious thoughts. 无意识的本体论在于大脑的客观特征，能够引发主观意识的思维。
This has the surprising consequence that a deep, allegedly psychological mechanism like Chomsky’s Language Acquisition Device, which allows a child to learn the grammar of a language on the basis of the samples of speech it encounters at an early age, is not a set of unconscious mental rules at all, but simply a physical mechanism—for it is incapable of giving rise to subjective conscious thought whose content consists of those rules themselves. So in Searle’s view, the child’s conformity to the rules in learning language is not an example of intrinsic intentionality, but only intentionality assigned by the linguist-observer. 这个令人惊讶的结果是，像乔姆斯基的语言习得装置这样的深层心理机制，它使得儿童能够根据早期接触到的语言样本来学习语法，实际上并不是一组无意识的心理规则，而只是一个物理机制——因为它无法产生以这些规则本身为内容的主观意识思维。所以在西尔的观点中，儿童在学习语言时对规则的遵守并不是内在的意向性的例子，而只是由语言学家观察者赋予的意向性。
In sum, consciousness is the essence of the mental, even if most mental states are not conscious at any given time. One cannot study any aspect of mental experience without including it or its possibility in the definition of what one is trying to understand. In particular, intentionality is inseparable from it. 总的来说，意识是心理的本质，即使大多数心理状态在任何给定的时间都不是有意识的。在研究心理体验的任何方面时，不能不将意识或其可能性纳入到所要理解的定义中。特别是，意向性与意识是密不可分的。
The Rediscovery of the Mind is trenchant, aggressive, and beautifully clear, in Searle’s best “What is all this nonsense?” style. As an antidote to one of the dominant illusions of our age, it deserves a wide audience. 《心灵的再发现》是塞尔的最佳作品之一，以他犀利、积极和清晰的风格，美丽地阐述了“这一切都是什么胡说八道？”的问题。作为对我们这个时代主要幻觉的解药，它值得广泛的关注。
Thomas Nagel is University Professor Emeritus at NYU. He is the author of The View From Nowhere, Mortal Questions, and Mind and Cosmos, among other books. (March 2019) 托马斯·纳格尔是纽约大学的名誉大学教授。他是《无处不在的视角》、《有限的问题》和《心灵与宇宙》等多本书的作者。（2019年3月）
But see Geoffrey Madell, Mind and Materialism (Edinburgh University Press, 1988). ↩ 但是请参阅Geoffrey Madell的《心灵与唯物主义》（爱丁堡大学出版社，1988年）。↩
Another reductionist strategy, which I haven’t the space to discuss here, is to substitute for a theory of what mental states are a theory of the externally observable grounds on which we ascribe mental states to people, and to claim that this system of “assertability conditions” is all the analysis the concepts need. One doesn’t identify mental phenomena with anything physical, because one doesn’t identify them with anything. But the conditions of applicability of mental concepts are, on this view, compatible with the world’s being nothing but a material system. This is essentially Daniel Dennett’s strategy in Consciousness Explained (Little, Brown, 1991) ↩ 另一种还原主义策略，我在这里没有足够的空间来讨论，是用可外部观察到的基础理论来替代对心理状态的理论，并声称这种“可断言条件”的系统就是这些概念所需要的全部分析。我们不将心理现象与任何物理事物等同，因为我们不将它们与任何事物等同。但是，在这种观点下，心理概念的适用条件与世界只是一个物质系统是相容的。这基本上是丹尼尔·丹尼特在《意识的解释》（Little, Brown, 1991）中采取的策略。
Behaviorism is more or less represented by Gilbert Ryle, identity theory by J.J.C. Smart, and functionalism by Hilary Putnam—but there are many writers and the literature is very large. See one of the excellent recent collections on the philosophy of mind: Ned Block, editor, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, two volumes (Harvard University Press, 1980); W.G. Lycan, editor, Mind and Cognition (Black-well, 1990); David Rosenthal, editor, The Nature of Mind (Oxford University Press, 1991). Putnam has now abandoned functionalism; see Representation and Reality (MIT Press, 1988). ↩ 行为主义在吉尔伯特·赖尔(Gilbert Ryle)的代表下或多或少得到了体现，身份理论由J.J.C. Smart代表，功能主义由希拉里·普特南(Hilary Putnam)代表，但是有很多作家，相关文献非常丰富。可以参考一些关于心灵哲学的优秀近期文集，例如：Ned Block编辑的《心理学哲学读本》两卷本（哈佛大学出版社，1980年）；W.G. Lycan编辑的《心灵与认知》（布莱克韦尔出版社，1990年）；David Rosenthal编辑的《心灵的本质》（牛津大学出版社，1991年）。普特南现在已经放弃了功能主义，可以参考他的著作《表征与现实》（麻省理工学院出版社，1988年）。↩
To declare an interest: I am one of those cited as proponents of this line of argument, the others being Saul Kripke and Frank Jackson. ↩
Eliminative materialism was first proposed by Paul Feyerabend and Richard Rorty; versions of the view are defended by Steven Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief (MIT Press, 1983); Paul M. Churchland, Matter and Consciousness: A Contemporary Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind (MIT Press, 1984); and Patricia S. Churchland, Neurophilosophy (MIT Press, 1986). ↩
Searle identifies me as a defender of property dualism. I prefer the term “dual aspect theory,” to express the view deriving from Spinoza that mental phenomena are the subjective aspects of states which can also be described physically. But all I would claim for the idea is that it is somewhat less unacceptable than the other unacceptable theories currently on offer. I share Searle’s aversion to both dualism and materialism, and believe a solution to the mind-body problem is nowhere in sight. ↩
Colin McGinn, in The Problem of Consciousness (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), suggests that we are constitutionally incapable of arriving at such an understanding. Though he could be right, I think his pessimism is premature. ↩
See Searle’s essay “Minds, Brains, and Programs,” in the journal Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Vol. 3, No. 3, September 1980, pp. 417–424. See also Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1983). ↩
Such a procedure is called an algorithm. ↩
The general theory of this type of computability was developed by Alan Turing. ↩
See “Minds, Brains, and Programs.” ↩